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David 3. Gerbert
Assertion by states of a right to regulate conduct beyond their borders
has been a source of frequent controversy and serious international con-
flicts for more than half a century.1 Economic, political and technologi-
cal developments have forced jurisdictional analysis out of the neat
confines of the territoriality principle, and states have asserted the right
to regulate foreign conduct on the basis of the effects of such conduct
within their borders.
Jurisdiction based on effects is incompatible, however, with the con-
ceptual premises of the traditional territorial view of international juris-
diction.2 The so-called "effects principle" expands the jurisdictional
rights of regulating states, but it fails to provide an effective framework
for protecting the interests of states that might be affected by this expan-
sion of jurisdiction.
During the past decade United States courts, in an effort to minimize
international conflict, have begun to utilize a so-called "balancing" ap-
proach to international jurisdictional analysis.3 Under this approach, the
court weighs the relative interests of the United States against those of
other states affected by a particular exercise of U.S. jurisdiction.4
Adoption of a balancing approach is an important step toward the de-
velopment of a viable jurisdictional framework. Yet balancing, by itself,
does not provide a solution to the jurisdictional problem. This Article
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1. Conflicts relating to jurisdiction over criminal offenses involving more than one state
began to create significant controversies during the nineteenth century. The development is
reviewed in the Harvard Research on International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 484-503 (Supp. 1935).
2. Efforts have been made to accoinmodate the effects principle within the concept of
territoriality by substantially expanding the latter concept. See infra text accompanying notes
44-48; Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 156-61 (1957).
3. See infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
4. The court may refuse to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction when "the interests of the
United States are too weak . . . to justify an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction."
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d. 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976).
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advances the proposition that non-interference, a long-standing principle
of international law, is a necessary ingredient of an effective jurisdic-
tional framework.5
This Article first describes the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction.6
It then reviews the historical development of the jurisdictional doctrine
and exposes the deficiencies of the balancing approach. Next, the Article
examines the principle of non-interference in international law doctrine
and practice. 7 Finally, the Article considers the need to develop and in-
tegrate the principle of non-interference into the framework of interna-
tional jurisdiction, and discusses the obstacles to such development.
.Because the extraterritoriality issue has developed primarily in relation
to the application of United States antitrust laws, and in order to keep
the present discussion within manageable bounds, this Article will focus
on the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the antitrust law con-
text. The perspectives developed here, however, are considered to be of
general application.
I. Extraterritoriality and the Jurisdictional Conflict
A. Jurisdictional Conflicts: Dimensions of the Problem
The national regulation of transnational economic activity has become
a source of embarrassing and potentially dangerous international tension
and conflict. Moreover, the likelihood of conflicts continues to increase.
5. A leading appeals court in West Germany has held that, in fact, international law has
developed such a system. For a detailed analyisis of the German approach, see Gerber, The
Extraterritorial Application of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983).
6. The term "extraterritorial jurisdiction" is here used to refer to a jurisdictional claim by
a state over conduct outside its borders. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
7. The recent legal literature on the subject of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been exten-
sive, and one dares add to it only with great respect for the difficulties of the subject matter,
According to one recent review of this literature:
Although the literature on extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law is
voluminous, its ideas are few and its repetitiveness great. The same propositions are ad-
vanced year after year with little noticeable effect one way or the other. Most of the
writing in law reviews and treatises is concerned only with what the legal rules are, not
with their economic consequences. Much of the more popular literature treats the polit-
ical impact of extraterritoriality by discussing how United States officials have annoyed
foreign nations by trying to apply United States antitrust laws to foreign corporations and
nationals. The economic aspect of this subject is addressed primarily in congressional and
executive publications. This sort of discussion usually is structured to produce the result
desired by the committee or agency issuing the publication. Witnesses whose views are
already well-known are invited to testify. Representatives of business or government serve
on special commissions and deliver the pronouncements expected of them. There is a
rehearsed, artificial flavor to much of the testimony and many of the reports, all of which
are part of a process that is more political than intellectual.
Hood, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws: A Selective Bibliogra-
phy, 15 VAND. I. TRANSNAT'L L. 765, 767 (1982).
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In particular, the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United
States has created, and continues to create, significant international con-
flicts.8 These conflicts often have damaged U.S. foreign relations-ese-
cially with its allies-and they have even been held responsible for
weakening the western alliance.9
The international conflicts resulting from these national claims to in-
ternational regulatory rights have been manifested on the levels of diplo-
matic protest, of public confrontation, and of legislation designed to
thwart certain exercises of jurisdiction, the so-called "blocking legisla-
tion." At each level such conflicts have a negative impact on U.S. inter-
ests, both public and private.
Jurisdictional conflicts are more commonly encountered at the diplo-
matic level, and such conflicts have been an important source of friction
between the U.S. and its allies. According to one source:
In recent years, almost every bilateral or multilateral meeting between eco-
nomic officials of the United States and Western Europe has included some
objection from the European side to United States antitrust enforcement. It
has become also an almost automatic agenda item in diplomatic meetings
with the Australians and the Canadians.10
There has also been little foreign diplomatic support for U.S. actions.
One former government official estimates that "there have been five dip-
lomatic protests of U.S. cases for every instance of express diplomatic
support. . . ."I The tensions created by these repeated complaints rep-
resent a significant burden on U.S. foreign relations.
In a substantial number of cases foreign governments have felt suffi-
ciently aggrieved by American jurisdictional assertions to take the addi-
tional step of "going public" with their grievances. Some governments
have even gone before U.S. courts to plead restraint in the application of
U.S. antitrust laws, in spite of a traditional reluctance on the part of
states to appear in foreign courts for such purposes.12
8. Although such conflicts have generally involved the extraterritorial application of U.S.
laws, similar problems have arisen in connection with the application of the German antitrust
laws. See generally Gerber, supra note 5.
9. See, ag., D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCE viii (1982); Gordon, Extraterritorial Application of United States Economic Laws:"
Britain Draws the Line, 14 INT'L L. 151 (1980).
10. 1 J. ATwOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTrRUST AND AMERICAN BuSiNESS ABROAD 101
(1981).
11. Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 500, 502 (1981).
12. See, e.g., Brief of the French Government as amicus curiae, quoted in FTC v. Compa-
gnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d. 1300, 1306 (D.C. 1980). See generally Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Participation in Antitrust Proceedings
in Member Countries as Amicus Curiae, 22 ANTrrRUST BULL. 863 (1977).
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When a state takes the conflict to the level of public confrontation,
media involvement and public reactions often create political pressure to
resist U.S. "incursions into local sovereignty." From such pressures
charges of "American imperialism" have often arisen.
Such confrontations sometimes have taken on major proportions. In
the 1950's, U.S. jurisdictional assertions relating to the Swiss watchmak-
ers' cartel aroused extraordinary public outcry against the United States
and caused Swiss authorities to threaten the U.S. with a variety of sanc-
tions. 13 More recently, the application of U.S. antitrust laws to the ura-
nium cartel in the late 1970's has had significant public repercussions in
countries such as Canada 14 and Australia. 15 *
A third level to which jurisdictional conflicts have recently been ex-
tended is that of retaliatory or "blocking" legislation. A significant
group of foreign governments has passed legislation to thwart the exer-
cise of U.S. jurisdiction by such means as prohibiting cooperation in U.S.
legal proceedings and denying recognition to certain judgments. Such
legislative action is a response to domestic political resentment of U.S.
jurisdictional assertions and an attempt to protect domestic enterprises
from the costs and risks of subjection to U.S. jurisdiction. Among the
countries which have some form of blocking legislation are the United
Kingdom, 16 New Zealand, 17 France,' Australia, 19 and Canada.20
In recent years conflicts resulting from the exercise of extraterritorial
13. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade
Cas. (CCI-) % 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). The case is discussed in detail in HaightThe Watchmakers Case, in COM-
MON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CONFLICT 311-63 (J. Rahi ed.
1970).
14. For the Canadian perspective, see, e.g., Henry, The United States Antitrust Laws: A
Canadian Viewpoint, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 249 (1970), and Blair, The Canadian Experience, in
PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER
LAWS 65 (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
15. For the Australian view, see, e.g., Cira, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block Ameri-
can Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 253 (1982).
16. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. For an authoritative discussion of
the act, see Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: the British Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
17. Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2), N.Z. Stat. No. 27, Part IV (1980).
18. Law Concerning the Communication of Documents or Information of an Economic,
Commercial, Industrial, Financial or Technical Nature to Aliens, Whether Natural or Artifi-
cial Persons, No. 80-583 (1980) J.O. 1799 [hereinafter cited as Law Concerning the Communi-
cation of Documents] reprinted in Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Laws, 15 INT'L L. 585, 609 (1981).
19. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence), Act of 1976, Aust. Acts No.
121 and Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act of 1979, Aust. Acts
No. 13. See generally Taylor, The Extraterritoriality of the Australian Antitrust Law, 13 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 273 (1979).
20. Act of Dec. 15, 1975, ch. 76 [1974-76] Can. Stat. 1535, amending Combines Investiga-
tion Act, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. C-23 (1979).
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jurisdiction have increased in both frequency and intensity. The increas-
ing internationalization of the world economy means that currently ex-
isting national regulations have an ever-increasing potential for
application to foreign conduct. Moreover, the opportunities for enforc-
ing judgments in such cases increase as corporate assets become scattered
throughout many jurisdictions. Finally, the growing desire of govern-
ments worldwide to regulate economic activity shows few signs of
abating.
B. The Conceptual Context
The term "jurisdiction" is used in a variety of contexts, and it is there-
fore necessary to clarify the specific object of our inquiry. We are con-
cerned here with "international jurisdiction." At issue is whether a state
may take certain actions, and this is an issue of international law.
The rights or entitlements 21 included within the concept of interna-
tional jurisdiction are commonly divided into three categories-prescrip-
tive, adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction.22 For each of these there
is a separate set of governing principles. In general, prescriptive jurisdic-
tion denotes the right to attach legal consequences to conduct; adjudica-
tory jurisdiction denotes the right to adjudicate with respect to particular
persons in a particular case; and enforcement jurisdiction denotes the
right to enforce the determination of a court.23
We are here concerned with prescriptive jurisdiction,24 which may be
defined as:
[the] authority of a state to apply its law to the conduct, relations, or status
or interests of persons, or to things, whether by legislation, by executive act
or order, administrative rule or regulation, or judgment of a court, whether
in general or in particular cases. 25
21. The term "entitlement" has the advantage of being more objective than the term
"rights." See D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM.
L.R. 1100, 1113 (1982).
22. There is some variation in terminology in this area. Some writers, for example, divide
jurisdictional entitlements into only two categories. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1965).
23. International jurisdictional conflicts often do not arise until a state attempts to enforce
a determination of its courts, and, therefore, they technically may involve enforcement rather
than prescriptive jurisdiction. Yet the principles governing prescriptive jurisdiction determine
which states may attach legal consequences to conduct, and thus the effectiveness of the legal
framework of prescriptive jurisdiction ultimately determines the likelihood of international
conflicts.
24. Prescriptive jurisdiction is often called "legislative jurisdiction." The latter nomencla-
ture may, however, be misleading, for it suggests that the prescriptive function is necessarily
performed by a legislature. It thus reflects a civil law bias.
25. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, PART IV,
§402 (REvISED) (TENT. DRAFT No. 2) (1981). This draft is summarized in Henkin, Restate-
189
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Conflicts over prescriptive jurisdiction arise when the same conduct is
subjected to jurisdictional asserions by more than one state. Thus, the
causes of such jurisdictional conflicts and their negative effects on world
order must be sought in the principles governing international prescrip-
tive jurisdiction.
As currently framed, the issue of whether a state has prescriptive juris-
diction under international law is determined solely by whether the state
has a proper "basis" of jurisdiction. The issue involves analysis of the
relationship of the regulating state to the conduct involved.
There are three generally recognized bases of jurisdiction.26 The pri-
mary one is territoriality. According to this principle, a state has juris-
diction over conduct that occurs within its borders. This principle is
fully accepted and forms the basis of the traditional jurisdictional system.
Nationality provides a second basis of jurisdiction. It entitles a state to
exercise jurisdiction over its nationals and corporation-, regardless of
where their conduct occurs. Though there is some lack of clarity con-
cerning the scope of this principle, its validity is generally accepted.27 A
third basis of jurisdiction is the so-called,"effects" principle, under which
a state has jurisdiction over foreign conduct which has certain effects
within that state. When either the nationality principle or the effects
principle serves as a basis for a jurisdictional assertion, the jurisdiction is
generally referred to as "extraterritorial," 28 because the subject conduct
occurred "outside" the territory of the regulating state.29
It should be noted that in the context of U.S. domestic litigation the
concept of international prescriptive jurisdiction is generally treated as
an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Under United States law, a court
ment of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised): Tentative Draft No. 2, 75 AM.
J. INT'L L. 987 (1981).
26. Two secondary "bases" of jurisdiction also are generally recognized: (1) the protective
principle, which confers jurisdiction when conduct threatens the security of the state, and (2)
the universality principle, which confers jurisdiction over a very limited number of types of
conduct which are considered unive ally abhorrent. See Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, arts. 7 and 9, in Harvard Research on International Law, supra note 1,
at 440. These bases of jurisdiction are seldom used, and play virtually no role in regard to tile
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.
27. See, e.g., Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 39 (1964).
28. The term has caused substantial misunderstanding. Its widespread acceptance, how-
ever, continues to justify its use. For criticisms, see I E. NEREP, EXTRATERRITORIAL CON-
TROL OF COMPETITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW XX (1983).
29. The U.S. Department of State has indicated that it prefers the term "conflicts of juris-
diction." See, eg., Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, DEP'T OF STATE
CURRENT POLICY BULL. No. 481, at 1 (April 15, 1983). This term, however, refers to the
potential problems created by the assertion of jurisdiction rather than to the jurisdictional
assertion itself.
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does not have subject matter jurisdiction when there is no principle of
U.S. law which may be properly applicable to the controversy before it.
If the application of a legal rule would violate international law, this fact
may make it inapplicable in a domestic court.30
C. The Conflict Scenario
The concept of effects jurisdiction is responsible for most international
jurisdictional conflicts because it challenges the territorial principle
which has traditionally delineated the reach of a state's jurisdiction. In a
world fragmented into numerous territorial entities, when a state claims
jurisdiction based on the effects principle, it is very likely that at least one
other state will have a territorial interest in the conduct involved. The
former state has a regulatory interest in the conduct, but its assertion of
jurisdiction is likely to affect the legal status of nationals of the latter
state, and it may impinge on the international legal rights of that state. 31
In addition, a third state also may have an interest based on the national-
ity of some of the parties to the conduct.
The conflict scenario is revealing. Assume that State A believes itself
justified by the effects principle in exercising jurisdiction over foreign
conduct in State B that has consequences within State A. Acting on the
assumption that it has such a right, State A exercises jurisdiction over
that conduct. The legality of the decision is determined solely by refer-
ence to the relationship of the conduct to State A.
Because the conduct over which State A has asserted jurisdiction oc-
curred in State B, State A's action is likely to affect the interests and/or
rights of State B. State B is likely, therefore, to oppose such action and,
if possible, to take the position that the exercise of jurisdiction is not
authorized by international law.
There are at least three grounds for a claim by State B that State A has
violated international law. State B could contest the validity of the ef-
fects principle as a basis for any assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
A group of states, 32 led by the United Kingdom, has in fact taken the
position that the effects principle is simply invalid. The United Kingdom
claims that international jurisdiction is inherently and necessarily territo-
30. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 110-157 and accompanying text.
32. The size of this group is difficult to ascertain for two reasons. First, the persistent
confusion between the effects principle and the objective territoriality principle tends to ob-
scure discussions of the subject. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. Second, many
states previously asserting the invalidity of the effects principle have now adopted it as a juris-
dictional basis for their own legislation without officially acknowledging their change in
position.
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rial and therefore a state may not exercise jurisdiction over foreign per-
sons on the basis of conduct that occurs outside of its own territory.33
The British position may be undermined, however, by the European Eco-
nomic Community's utilization of the effects principle in applying its an-
titrust legislation.34
The second possible claim acknowledges the validity of the effects
principle, but argues that the particular exercise of jurisdiction by State
A was invalid because it did not satisfy the requirements of the effects
principle. Because there is little agreement concerning the scope of the
effects principle, however, states have generally avoided objecting on this
ground.35
The third type of claim recognizes the validity and the applicability of
the effects principle, but asserts that the particular exercise of jurisdiction
at issue violates international law because it interferes with legally pro-
tected interests of State B. This has been the most common type of ob-
jection to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 36
Note that the first two claims are fundamentally different from the
third. They look to the relationship between State A and the conduct
involved and ask whether the relationship provides a basis for jurisdic-
tion. The third claim looks to the protected interests of State B and asks
whether they have been violated by the exercise of jurisdiction. As cur-
rently formulated,37 however, the international jurisdictional paradigm
does not accommodate this third type of claim, and to that extent the
jurisdictional framework is deficient.
D. The Need for Structural Effectiveness and
Reasonable Predictability
In order to minimize conflicts, the jurisdictional framework must re-
flect both sets of relationships involved in the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. It must authorize jurisdiction on the basis of the relation-
33. See British Aide Memoire to the Commission of the European Communities, Oct. 20,
1969, reprinted in I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNAMTONAL LAw 310, 310-13
(1979).
34. See, eg., Beguelin Import Co. v. G. L. Import Export S.A., Case 22/71, E.C.R. 949
(1971); Imperial Chemical Industries v. E.C. Comm'n, 11 CoMM. MKT. L.R. 557 (1972).
35. The development of an international consensus concerning the scope of the effects
principle is likely to be advanced by recognition of the jurisdictional paradigm here advocated,
See infra notes 110-157 and accompanying text. Such a framework would encourage efforts to
reach agreement concerning the scope of the effects principle.
36. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
37. For development of the argument that current articulations or formulations of interna-
tional law often fail to reflect actual state practice in this area, see infra notes 123-60 and
accompanying text.
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ship between the regulating state and the conduct being regulated. As
important, however, it must delineate the circumstances under which the
exercise of such jurisdiction is prohibited because such exercise interferes
with legally protected interests of another state. If the jurisdictional
framework fails to do both, it is unlikely to be effective.
Generally accepted formulations of international law focus on the rela-
tionship between the regulating state and the conduct. 38 With limited
exceptions,39 however, they do not reflect the relationship between the
exercise of jurisdiction and any states which may be affected by such
exercise. The current structure of jurisdictional principles is thus defec-
tive, because it fails to reflect the legally protected interests of all states
involved in an international regulatory situation.
Further, because jurisdictional conflicts are likely to occur when there
is uncertainty about what international law allows, the jurisdictional par-
adigm also must be reasonably predictable. The applicable principles of
international law therefore must be not only generally accepted, but also
sufficiently clear so that their application yields reasonably predictable
results.
The failure of international law to articulate an effective jurisdictional
structure can be understood only by analyzing the historical development
of international law principles relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction.
II. Development of the Jurisdictional Paradigm
The problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the result of the break-
down of a legal paradigm. This fact, largely unnoticed, must be analyzed
so that the factors that have impeded understanding of the problem can
better be comprehended and so that legal thinking can proceed toward a
more effective jurisdictional framework.
Elements of this history have often been recounted, 4° but the underly-
ing developmental patterns have been insufficiently analyzed. Three
main threads of development can be isolated: the disintegration of a
longstanding international consensus; a growing divergence between the
jurisdictional needs of the international system and the conceptual struc-
tures provided for this purpose by international law;41 and the develop-
38. In the case of the nationality principle, the focus is on the relationship between the
state and the actor engaged in the conduct. This, however, is a special case and will not be
further discussed here.
39. For recent developments in German law in this area, see Gerber, supra note 5, at 744-
77.
40. See, e.g., 1 . ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 10, at §§6.02-6.11.
41. For an analysis of the relationship between jurisdictional principles and the needs of
Yale Journal of International Law
ment and persistence of legal misconceptions arising out of the inability
of international law to adapt readily to the changing needs and expecta-
tions of states.
A. Territoriality: The Traditional Approach to Jurisdiction
Traditional international law principles relating to jurisdiction were
well-established by the eighteenth century.42 The governing principle
was that of territoriality. Based on a conceptual framework developed
largely by the Dutch scholar Ulrich Huber in the sixteenth century and
embedded in the U.S. legal system by Joseph Story,43 the scheme was
simple enough. The world was carved up into jurisdictional spheres cor-
responding to the territories of states. A state was entitled to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction regarding any conduct within its territory; con-
versely, a state could not exercise jurisdiction over conduct occurring
outside of its boundaries, except with regard to its own nationals.44
Jurisdictional conflicts generally were avoided under this territorial
system so long as (1) situations in which conduct in one state would have
had significant consequences in other states were comparatively rare, and
(2) legal systems generally attached legal consequences to conduct only
when the effects that were constituent elements of the offense were
closely related both temporally and spatially to the conduct causing
them. As long as states generally were content to regulate the conduct of
individuals in their direct relations with other individuals, there was little
disintegrative pressure on the territorial scheme.
During the late nineteenth century, new factors began to threaten this
neat system. Developments in transportation and communications made
it possible for persons acting in one state quickly and effectively to cause
effects in other states. Moreover, the growing concentration of business
and the internationalization of the world economy meant that actions
taken in one state could have multiple effects far beyond that state's bor-
ders. A cartel arrangement in one state, for example, could significantly
affect prices and even national welfare in distant states.
These factors led to an expansion of the territorial principle to include
the so-called "objective" territorial principle. 45 This notion "establishes
the jurisdiction of the state to prosecute and punish for crimes com-
the international system, see Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersec-
tion Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982).
42. Mann, supra note 27, at 27.
43. See Maier, supra note 41, at 282-84.
44. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
45. This development also yielded the so-called "subjective" territorial principle. This con-
cept authorizes jurisdiction for the state in which a crime is begun, even though such crime
Vol. 10:185, 1984
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menced without the state but consummated within its territory." 46 ' By
means of this principle a state in which a criminal act was completed
would not be deprived of jurisdiction to prosecute the crime.
The objective territorial principle, however, has been the source of ex-
traordinary difficulties. 47 As originally conceived, its application was
limited to situations in which some element of a crime actually occurred
in the regulating state.48 But problems were created by the lack of clear
conceptual limits to the objective territoriality principle.
Nevertheless, at least as originally conceived, the objective territorial
principle was consistent with territoriality, for it was applied only when
the consequences of conduct could be "localized." So long as an offense
could only be "consummated" in one place, the functional effectiveness
of the territorial paradigm was unimpaired. Jurisdiction was generally
conferred on only two states-the state in which the conduct occurred
and the state in which the consequences were localized. As the conse-
quences of traditional criminal acts by individuals are generally localiz-
able in this respect, use of the objective territorality principle in relation
to such violations created little risk of jurisdictional conflicts and left the
territorial framework intact.
The territorial system was undermined only when states began to de-
fine crimes in terms of effects which could easily be achieved across sig-
nificant distances and in many different places at the same time.49 Such
effects were not "localizable" to any particular place because the conduct
causing them started a series of consequences that could lead in many
directions. For example, cartel arrangements in one country could create
distant and multiple effects. Thus, when cartel behavior was proscribed,
the territoriality principle could not accommodate the situation, for these
effects were not localizable. As a result, it was primarily the advent of
economic regulation-specifically, antitrust regulation-which under-
mined the territorial system.
The judicial opinion marking the beginning of the disintegration of the
may be completed in another state. See Harvard Research on International Law, supra note 1,
at 484-87.
46. Id. at 487-88.
47. Many writers have failed to distinguish between the effects principle and the objective
territoriality principle. See, e.g., Shenefield, The Perspectives of the U.S. Department of Justice,
in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND
OTHER LAWS 12, 15 (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
48. According to Professor Jennings, "The essential requirement of the objective applica-
tions of the territorial principle is that some part of the crime should in fact have taken place
within the territory of the State claiming jurisdiction." Supra note 2, at 158.
49. One writer has argued that the effects principle should serve as the basis for jurisdic-
tion only with regard to the "primary effects" of any conduct. See Akehurst, Jurisdiction in
International Law, 46 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 145, 154-55 (1972-73).
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territorial system had nothing to do, however, with economic regulation.
In the S.S. Lotus case,50 decided in 1929 by the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice, France claimed that Turkey had violated interna-
tional law by asserting criminal jurisdiction over the conduct of a French
citizen serving on a French ship. The basis of the jurisdictional assertion
was the French citizen's alleged responsibility for a collision with a Turk-
ish ship on the high seas that resulted in the loss of several Turkish
seamen. A divided court held that Turkey had a concurrent right to
exercise jurisdiction over the conduct in question.51
Two aspects of the opinion have played an important role in the devel-
opment of the extraterritoriality issue. First, the Court established a pre-
sumption in favor of the existence of prescriptive jurisdiction:
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which re-
lates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on
some permissive rule of international law. ... Far from laying down a
general prohibition to the effect that states may not extend the application
of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and
acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of
discretion which is only limited to certain cases by prohibitive rules; as re-
gards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it
regards as best and most suitable.52
Although the court stated that prescriptive jurisdiction may be limited by
prohibitory rules, it found no such rules applicable to the facts of the
case. As a result, the court's language created the widespread impression
that it had sanctioned broad state discretion with respect to jurisdiction.
This presumption in favor of jurisdiction continues to influence the juris-
dictional debate.5 3
A second central aspect of the Lotus case was its treatment of the ob-
jective territoriality principle. According to the court:
It is certain that the courts of many countries, even of countries which have
given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret
criminal law in the sense that offenses, the authors of which at the moment
of commission are in the territory of another state, are nevertheless to be
regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the
50. The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 10 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 19.
53. See, eg., INT'L L. AssN., REPORT OF THE FiFrv-FinsT CONFERENCE, 362-74 (1964);
K. BREWSTER, ANTITRusT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 285 (1958). Reliance on the
Lotus case to support a claim of jurisdictional discretion, however, is misplaced. Prior to the
Lotus case, jurisdiction had for centuries been almost exclusively territorial. Consequently,
there not only had been no need for the development of principles of jurisdictional restraint,
but no opportunity for such rules to be created.
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constituent elements of the offense, and more especially its effects, have
taken place there. . . . In this case [therefore] a prosecution may also be
justified from the point of view of the so-called territorial principle.54
The court found that the collision-caused deaths aboard a Turkish flag
vessel-an extension of Turkish territory-were constituent elements of
the offense of manslaughter and that the manslaughter thus could be con-
sidered to have occurred within Turkey for jurisdictional purposes. The
Court's very broad formulation of the objective territoriality principle
opened the way for a subtle, but fundamentally important, extension of
that principle.
The next step in this extension was the publication in 1935 of the re-
sults of the Harvard Research on International Law, a massive research
project sponsored by the Harvard Law School.55 The draft convention
representing the culmination of the project included a provision that was
itself well within the traditional concept of objective territoriality.5 6 In
their comments on the objective territorial principle, however, the au-
thors stated the principle of objective territoriality much more broadly,
stating that "the setting in motion outside of a state of a force which
produces as a direct consequence an injurious effect therein justifies the
territorial sovereign in prosecuting the actor when he enters his do-
main."57 These overly broad statements set the stage for the break with
the traditional legal framework of territoriality that occurred in 1945
with the decision in U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).58
Prior to Alcoa, U.S. courts generally had adhered to the territorial
principle in applying the antitrust laws. For example, in American Ba-
nana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,5 9 the first case in which the United States
Supreme Court was asked to apply U.S. antitrust law to foreign conduct,
the Court had no difficulty in refusing to apply the Sherman Act to con-
duct in Costa Rica that allegedly was monopolistic within the meaning of
Section 2 of that Act. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, even stated
that the very suggestion that U.S. law could-reach behavior beyond U.S.
borders was "startling."0
54. The S.S. Lotus, at 23.
55. Harvard Research on International Law, supra note 1.
56. According to Article 3 of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
"A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed in whole or in part within its
territory. This jurisdiction extends to (a) Any participation outside its territory in a crime
committed in whole or in part within its territory." Id. at 480.
57. 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (1922).
58. 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
59. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). The precedential value of this case for jurisdictional purposes may
have been limited by the fact that there were no allegations of an effect on U.S. commerce.
60. Id. at 355.
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Although several antitrust cases during the following three and a half
decades have been interpreted as indicating a willingness on the part of
U.S. courts to diverge from the strict application of the territorial princi-
ple,61 no fact situation required the courts to address squarely the extra-
territoriality issue until Alcoa.
B. Alcoa and the Rise of the Effects Principle
In Alcoa, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by
designation in the absence of an effective quorum on the Supreme Court,
handed down an opinion that reversed American Banana, veering
sharply from traditional doctrine and establishing a new U.S. approach
to the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Alcoa involved an aluminum cartel centered outside the United States,
whose members intentionally controlled the amount of aluminum they
sent to the United States in a manner which, if performed within the
United States, would have constituted a violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.62 The court formulated the issue before it as whether that
statute also applied when the conduct occurred outside of the U.S. The
court thus squarely faced the issue of extraterritoriality.6 3
Two elements of the opinion have been of critical importance in shap-
ing subsequent thinking about the extraterritoriality issue. The first is
the court's analytical method, and the second is the conclusions it
reached in applying that method.
According to Judge Hand, writing for the court, the first step in ana-
lyzing the reach of the Sherman Act was to determine whether Congress
intended that the act reach the conduct involved. Because the supremacy
clause of the U.S. Constitution requires a U.S. court to apply federal law
according to the intention of Congress, this represented an unexceptional
starting point for analysis.64
The court's point was not that there are no limits under international
law on the right of the United States to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
conduct but rather that the courts must obey Congress, and if Congress
decides to violate international law and thereby incur international re-
sponsibility for such a violation, the courts must follow the directions of
Congress in applying the statute.
61. See generally 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 10, at §6.04.
62. Alcoa, 148 F. 2d at 421.
63. Id. at 422, 434-35.
64. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922). See also American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437
(1932).
Vol. 10:185, 1984
Reach of National Laws
Congressional intent as to the territorial scope of statutes, however, is
often unclear. U.S. statutes, including the Sherman Act, seldom specifi-
cally designate their territorial scope, and legislative history seldom
reveals any serious Congressional concern over the issue.65 As a result,
the Alcoa court utilized a presumption about congressional intent, stating
that Congress would not have intended the Sherman Act to apply in such
a way as to violate international law. According to the court, "we are
not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without regard to
the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their
powers .... -66 Judge Hand was again following established U.S. legal
principles in in-terpreting the statute so as to conform to existing interna-
tional law.67 The court thus accorded international law a critical analyti-
cal role in the extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes.
The court next asked whether the facts of the case provided a basis for
jurisdiction under international law. It found that "it is settled law...
that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states
will ordinarily recognize."'68 Accordingly, the court found the Sherman
Act applicable to the foreign conduct because it was "intended to affect
imports and did affect them."'69
Thus, the Alcoa opinion introduced the principle that jurisdiction
could be based solely on the effects of foreign conduct. The effects princi-
ple, as established in Alcoa, eliminated the requirement of a close rela-
tionship between the conduct and its effects. According to the test
established by Judge Hand, a state could proscribe any "conduct outside
its borders that has consequences which the state reprehends." 70 Thus,
Alcoa introduced a jurisdictional basis that is fundamentally inconsistent
with a territoriality-based jurisdictional system.
Alcoa also sowed the seeds of international discord, for it marked the
break-up of the existing consensus concerniiag the relationship between
jurisdiction and territoriality. SinceAlcoa, the international discussion of
65. For the Sherman Act see, eg., 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 10, at 25.
66. 148 F. 2d at 443.
67. See, eg., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, 404 F. 2d 804, 814 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
68. 148 F. 2d at 443.
69. Id. at 444. The Court cited no support for its requirement that the conduct be inten-
tional, however, and merely appeared to be including what it considered a reasonable restric-
tion on the scope of the new effects doctrine. This gave the unfortunate impression that the
requirements of international law were satisfied by the existence of any effects and that any
further limitations on the principle were at the discretion of the individual domestic judge.
70. 148 F. 2d at 443.
199
Yale Journal of International Law
jurisdictional issues has been dominated by this disintegration and its
consequences.
C. The Aftermath of Alcoa
The Alcoa decision is the central fact in the development of the extra-
territoriality issue. It established a new U.S. approach to jurisdiction
which progressively undermined the existing territoriality paradigm.
Moreover, other states perceived this deviation from territoriality as
threatening their interests. The result has been a polarity in thinking
about extraterritorial jurisdiction which has tended to inhibit the devel-
opment of a more comprehensive framework.
Almost four decades after the Alcoa decision, the controversy sur-
rounding the effects principle continues, but the legal situation and its
regulatory context have changed significantly. Two factors have been of
particular significance in this development: (15 the controversy over the
validity of the effects principle; and (2) the increasing use of the effects
principle by states other than the United States.
The timing of the Alcoa decision is critical in assessing its significance.
Because in 1945 Europeans had more pressing concerns than the asser-
tion of a new extraterritorial jurisdictional principle by the United States,
there was a significant and perhaps misleading delay in international re-
sponse to the effects principle. Moreover, Europe's dependence on the
United States in the years immediately following the Second World War
may have inhibited some European states from protesting against U.S.
actions. Finally, the special circumstances of the immediate postwar pe-
riod provided relatively few factual opportunities for U.S. courts to apply
the effects doctrine.
As a result, the usual means by which the international community
registers its conceptions of what is acceptable under international law
were largely inoperative for several years. Because acquiescence is gener-
ally considered evidence of acceptance of a principle of international law,
the postwar situation seems to have created the impression in the United
States that the effects principle was generally acceptable to the world
community. 71
Significant reactions to the effects principle did eventually occur, how-
ever, especially beginning in the early 1950's when a series of important
tests of the effects principle arose in U.S. courts. The response of the
world community was predictable. The effects principle was generally
71. See, eg., Whitney, Sources of Conflict between International Law and Antitrust Laws,
63 YALE L. J. 655 (1954).
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criticized and rejected as invalid under international law. 72 Moreover,
European states criticized the United States for "exporting" its legisla-
tion and, implicitly, its way of life, to other countries.73 At a time when
Europe was especially sensitive to domination by the U.S., the effects
doctrine looked to many like "imperialism," for it forced European en-
terprises to conduct their affairs in a particular way in order to conform
to U.S. conceptions of economic liberalism. 74
The fact that the effects principle was primarily used to apply antitrust
law is of particular importance, because antitrust law was viewed as pri-
marily a U.S. "invention." 75 Although some general ideas of antitrust
began to gain favor outside the United States during the post-war period,
the progress was gradual. As a result, the effects principle appeared to
represent U.S. attempts to force its own economic ideology on other
countries, and therefore it was seen as a threat by many countries.
Thus, legal thinking on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction was
polarized. On the one hand, the U.S. continued to apply its antitrust
laws extraterritorially, justifying such applications under the effects prin-
ciple. On the other hand, the states affected by the exercise of effects
jurisdiction attempted to protect themselves by rejecting the validity of
the effects principle in toto. The extraterritoriality issue was cast in the
form of a controversy over the validity of the effects principle, and only
recently has the hold of this polarized thinking begun to loosen.
While the legal controversy continued to center on the debate over the
effects principle, an important change in actual state practice occurred as
a significant number of jurisdictions, including some of those that had
been protesting use of the effects principle by the United States, adopted
the principle for use in applying their own antitrust laws. The effects
principle was specifically written into the German antitrust statute en-
acted in 1958.76 In addition, it is considered a basis of jurisdiction by,
among others, France,77 Switzerland, 78 Denmark,79 Sweden,80 and the
72. For a representative sampling of views, see INT'L L. ASS'N, REPORT OF FIFTY-
FouRTH CONFERENCE 223, 562-92 (1970).
73. See, eg., Jennings, supra note 2, at 175.
74. See generally Picciotto, Jurisdictional Conflicts, International Law and the Interna-
tional State System, 11 INT'L J. Soc. L. 11 (1983).
75. See generally C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES 1-14 (1967).
76. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen, 1957 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 1081
(July 27). See also Gerber, supra note 5, at 760-63.
77. See Goldman, Les champs d'application territoriale des lois sur la concurrence, 128
RECUEIL DE CouRs 631, 669 (1969).
78. See, eg, Federal Tribunal, March 21, 1967, quoted in Imperial Chemical Industries v.
E. C. Comm'n, 11 COMMON MKT. L.R. 557, 598 (1972); U. IMMENGA & E. MESTMAECKER,
KOMMENTAR ZUM GWB 1882 (1982).
79. See W. VON EYBEN, MONOPOLER O PRISER 120 (1982).
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European Economic Community.81 Thus the effects principle gradually
came to be accepted in the practice of states, while international legal
thinking remained focused on the debate over its validity.
These two processes have been accompanied by a third, which consists
of attempts to modify and limit the scope of the effects principle to re-
duce the likelihood of jurisdictional conflicts. A variety of concepts have
been used to reduce the scope of the effects concept. In addition to Al-
coa's requirement that effects be intended, effects have been required to
be, for example, "substantial," 82 "direct,"8 3 "generally recognized as
constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have
reasonably developed legal systems,"8 4 and, recently, "anticom-
petitive."585
Limiting the scope of the effects principle, however, has not provided a
basis for solving the problem of jurisdictional conflicts. This limitation
reduces the likelihood of conflict only insofar as it reduces the absolute
number of cases in which jurisdiction will be established on that basis. If
the only question a court asks is whether there are effects, regardless of
how modified or how defined, the interests of other states remain uncon-
sidered. In order to deal directly with the problem of avoidance of con-
fficts, a principle of jurisdictional protection was required.
III. Balancing: the U.S. Response to Jurisdictional Conflicts
In response to the reduced effectiveness of the territoriality paradigm,
courts in both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany86
recently have added as an additional factor in the analysis of interna-
80. See U. BERNITZ, SVENSK MARKNADSRAETr 98 (1983); 1 E. NEREP, supra note 28, at
301-04.
81. See, eg., Beguelin Import Co. v. G. L. Import Export SA, Case 22/71, E.C.R. 949
(1971).
82. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949).
83. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp 92, 102 (C.D. Cal,
1971), afl'd 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 47 (1965). According to Section 18 of that Restatement:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either:
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime
or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule
applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent
with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably devel-
oped legal systems.
85. National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F. 2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
86. For German developments, see Gerber, supra note 5, at 772-79.
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tional jurisdiction a consideration of the interests of foreign nations.8 7
The conceptual framework to which United States courts have turned to
accommodate this consideration of foreign interests is that of "interest
balancing."' '8
There are two variants of the balancing approach. The first, which
may be called "comity balancing," requires a court having jurisdiction to
consider refraining from the exercise of its jurisdictional rights for the
purpose of avoiding international conflicts.89 A second variant, which
may be called "jurisdictional balancing," makes balancing a jurisdic-
tional issue by requiring a court to apply a balancing test in order to
determine whether, in fact, it has jurisdiction to attach legal conse-
quences to the conduct of the defendants. The failure to distinguish be-
tween these two approaches has led to much confusion.
A. Comity Balancing
The balancing concept first gained significant attention in the U.S.
with the publication in 1959 of Antitrust and American Business Abroad
by (then) Professor Kingman Brewster. Brewster called for a "jurisdic-
tional rule of reason" in applying the antitrust laws. 90 His rule of reason
asked courts to consider foreign interests and to decline to exercise juris-
diction when the potential for international conflict seemed excessive.
Significantly, Brewster's call for such a change was not based on nor-
mative international law.91 The action called for was politically-inspired
restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction. Courts were not required by in-
ternational law to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction; they were sup-
posed to do so to avoid conflict.
Brewster's suggestions did not find acceptance in the courts92 until
87. Id. at 756. Another approach to this problem was used in the OPEC litigation. There
the court did not use a balancing approach. It referred to the difficulty of such a task and
declined to interfere with the foreign policy prerogatives of the executive. International Ass'n
of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F. 2d 1354,1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cer denied, 456 U.S. 974 (1982).
88. The concept is borrowed from U.S. conflicts law. See generally Maier, supra note 41, at
285-91; Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579
(1983). See also, Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. CoMP. L.
1 (1984).
89. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976). For an illuminating analysis of the political aspects of the Timberlane approach, see
Maier, supra note 41, at 300-03.
90. See K. BREWSTER, supra note 53, at 301-08.
91. According to Brewster:
Since there is no binding external authority to which the U.S. has submitted these ques-
tions, any limitation, in the last analysis, is self-imposed. In that sense, the decision to
restrict jurisdiction is a matter of national policy, not sovereign power.
Id. at 287.
92. Section 40 of the First Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1962, con-
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1976, when, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N. T & S.A.
(Timberlane),93 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a balancing
test largely reflecting Brewster's ideas. Timberlane involved an alleged
conspiracy by a U.S. corporation and Honduran corporations and indi-
viduals to restrict the export of Honduran lumber to the United States in
violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The relevant conduct
occurred primarily in Honduras.
The Timberlane court analyzed the Alcoa test of Sherman Act applica-
bility and decided that it was no longer adequate: "An effect on United
States commerce, although necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction under
the antitrust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis on which to determine
whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a mat-
ter of international comity and fairness."'94 Effects within the state still
constituted a valid basis of jurisdiction, but international comity required
a balancing of interests to determine whether jurisdiction should be
asserted.95
Timberlane's balancing test required a court to assess the interests of
the U.S. in the conduct and compare them with the interests of other
affected jurisdictions. A court was to exercise jurisdiction only when the
contacts with the U.S. were sufficient to outweigh contacts with other
states that might be affected by the U.S. exercise of jurisdiction.
The balancing test enunciated in Timberlane was unstructured, with
the court merely stating that a court should assess the conflict and then
"determine whether in the face of it the contacts and interests of the
United States are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction." 96 Although the court provided a list of factors to be consid-
ered in applying the balancing test,97 the opinion gave no guidance as to
how a court was to evaluate these factors.
tamined a political balancing approach in the context of enforcement jurisdiction. RESTATE-
MENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1962). For analysis, see
Maier, supra note 41, at 293-95.
93. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 613 (emphasis in original).
95. But see Shenefield, supra note 47, at 22.
96. 549 F.2d at 614-15.
97. According to the court:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the
nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principle places of business of
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
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Timberlane has had an extensive impact. Subsequent cases have fol-
lowed its lead,98 and "balancing" is now established as part of the U.S.
approach to extraterritoriality.
B. The Problems of Comity Balancing
The balancing concept has been hailed as a solution to the problem of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, because it takes into consideration foreign in-
terests.99 To require that foreign interests be considered in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction is clearly a positive development, for it
introduces the notion that a workable jurisdictional paradigm must rec-
ognize these interests.
Nevertheless, comity balancing does not provide an effective solution
to the problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction. First, it is a political, not a
legal, solution. Comity balancing leaves the effects principle intact as a
basis of jurisdiction: it merely states that the court, having jurisdiction,
should use its jurisdictional power wisely by answering the additional
question of whether it should exercise such jurisdiction, based on a con-
sideration of the legitimate concerns of foreign countries. Balancing thus
operates as a political rather than a legal concept.
The political nature of comity balancing derives from its conceptual
context. Although the concept of comity has had a variety of meanings,
it is now generally considered to be little more than an exhortation to
"neighborliness," 10° with no specific content and no binding effect.
Thus, a process that operates within this conceptual framework merely
provides a discretionary basis for a court to consider the interests of for-
eign states in making its decision.
Further, in assessing and comparing the interests of foreign legal sys-
tems within this broad and essentially amorphous framework, the judge
is placed in the position of deciding whether in a given situation the
power of the United States to take a particular action should be re-
strained so as not to injure foreign relations. The notion that a domestic
judge should be authorized, much less compelled, to make such a polit-
ical decision has generally been recognized as inappropriate.101
The comity concept gives the appearance of sensitivity to the interests
98. See, e.g., Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979);
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
99. See, eg., 1 J. ATwoOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 10, at §6.11.
100. Maier points out that the original conception of comity included a mandatory as
well as a "neighborliness" element. See Maier, supra note 41, at 281-85. See generally Yntema,
The Comity Doctrine, 65 MicH. L. Rnv. 9 (1966).
101. See, eg., D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 9, at 68-80.
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of foreign states without in any way limiting a U.S. court's jurisdictional
competence; it provides a basis for taking foreign factors into considera-
tion without mandating that any weight be given such factors.
Furthermore, because comity balancing does not represent the applica-
tion of a legal principle, a judge's decision remains inherently and totally
discretionary, neither subject to the authority of prior decisions nor capa-
ble of creating precedent to guide future decisions.
The second major problem with comity balancing is that it is not part
of normative international law. The decision of a U.S. court acting in
accordance with the comity balancing concept does not purport to inter-
pret or apply a principle of international law, and, as a result, it remains
an isolated political decision unrelated to what any foreign or interna-
tional tribunal might do.
The third major defect of comity balancing is the amorphous content
of the idea of balancing. Since this defect is shared by jurisdictional bal-
ancing, it will be discussed below in conjunction with that issue.
C. Jurisdictional Balancing
Recognizing the problems mentioned above, the American Law Insti-
tute and several leading commentators have called for a change in the
basic structure of the jurisdictional issue.10 2 They have sought to remove
balancing from its comity limitations by arguing that the balancing pro-
cess should determine whether jurisdiction exists, not merely whether it
should be exercised.
According to the Draft Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Draft
Restatement), balancing is a jurisdictional concept required by interna-
tional law. Although the effects principle continues to establish the start-
ing point for jurisdictional analysis in the Draft Restatement, 10 3 Section
403 introduces the concept of "reasonableness" as a limitation on juris-
diction. According to that Section:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under Sec. 402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to the con-
duct, relations, status, or interests of persons or things having connections
with another state or states when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
102. See, ag., Maier, supra note 41; Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena:
Conflicts of Laws, International Law and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163
RECUEIL DES CoTRs 315 (1979).
103. Section 402 of the Draft Restatement provides that "a state may, under international
law, exercise jurisdiction to prescribe and apply its law with respect to (1) conduct outside its
territory which has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory ... " RE-
STATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (Draft No. 7, Jan. 18, 1985).
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unreasonable. 104
To determine whether an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, all the
relevant factors must be considered; this section contains a non-exhaus-
tive list of such factors. 10 5
Thus, under the Draft Restatement a court does not engage in the
political function of deciding whether it should exercise a right which it
has, but it engages rather in the legal function of determining whether it
has that right at all. Because it involves application of a legal principle,
jurisdictional balancing has the significant advantage over comity balanc-
ing of making balancing part of the legal process.10 6 Decisions are no
longer isolated exercises of discretion by individual judges, but are guided
by previous decisions and are capable of forming precedent to guide fu-
ture decisions. Through this process a body of experience can develop to
provide predictability in the future application of the balancing principle.
Moreover, putting the balancing test in a legal context avoids placing
domestic judges in the position of foreign policy referees. Thus jurisdic-
tional balancing remedies the set of problems associated with the non-
legal nature of comity balancing.
D. The Problems of Jurisdictional Balancing
Assigning to balancing a jurisdictional function, however, does not
remedy another set of problems. In order to address the extraterritorial-
104. Id. at §403.
105. According to section 403(2):
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or unreasonable is judged by evaluating
all the relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state, or (ii) has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating
state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between
that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regu-
lating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation
in question;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international political, legal or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system;
(g) the extent to which such regulation is of the kind adopted by other states;
(h) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
(i) the likelihood of conffict with regulation by other states.
Id.
106. One disadvantage of placing balancing in a legal rather than a political context is that
it could reduce the opportunity for negotiations by the State Department in those cases-
primarily government antitrust suits-in which such negotiations may play a role.
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ity issues effectively, a legal framework must be accepted and applied by
other states as part of international law. In the case of balancing, such
acceptance appears unlikely.
First, non-common law jurisdictions are generally reluctant to accord
judges the wide discretion that is called for by a balancing approach.
Civil law systems therefore are unlikely to accept balancing, at least in
this unstructured form. 10 7
Moreover, despite the Draft Restatement's attempt to ground balanc-
ing in the international law concept of reasonableness, balancing is not
internationally derived. Rather, it is an approach borrowed from U.S.
conflicts of law theory.
The most critical problem of balancing, however, is its vagueness. Bal-
ancing national interests on the basis of an amorphous standard of rea-
sonableness is unlikely to produce the predictability that is required to
minimize jurisdictional conflicts. Any effective jurisdictional scheme
must provide reasonable predictability, for uncertainty about what is per-
mitted by international law is a major source of jurisdictional conflicts.
No system can provide complete certainty, but to be effective it must
provide reasonably clear guidelines. Balancing provides no such
guidelines.' 08
Moreover, balancing does not provide a basis for developing concrete-
ness and predictability over time, 10 9 because it lacks conceptual struc-
ture. It provides minimal guidance concerning the kinds of factors to be
taken into consideration. Moreover, it says nothing about how these fac-
tors are to be evaluated and provides no standards by which these factors
may be weighed against each other.
As a decisional model, balancing is not likely to be effective in the
international jurisdictional context. Even in the context of domestic con-
107. Civil law countries have generally criticized the U.S. use of the balancing approach in
the conflicts of law area. For a recent collection of articles on the subject, see 30 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 1-146 (1982). In a review of balancing concepts employed in the field of conflicts of law, one
European scholar recently stated that:
The new tendencies [i.e. balancing theories] emerging in the U.S. have puzzled and
amazed European[s]. . . .Europeans tend to criticize [them] for granting judges a mea-
sure of freedom that goes beyond the limits of appropriate judicial discretion. . . .The
principle of legal certainty is of greater importance in Europe than in the U.S ..... The
new approaches may have abandoned generally accepted notions about the nature of legal
rules and judicial law-making.
Vitta, The Impact in Europe of the American "Conflicts Revolution," 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2-3
(1982).
108. Professor Lowenfeld seems to believe that a certain amount of predictability may be
achieved over time in the application of balancing concepts. See Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at
331.
109. The concept of balancing can, of course, be given additional conceptual structure. For
a discussion of relevant German developments, see Gerber, supra note 5, at 772-82.
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fficts law, balancing has not been perceived outside the United States as
an effective legal structure, 110 and in the United States it often has been
seen as only a temporary expedient to provide an experiential base for
developing new conflicts principles.11
Domestic conflicts cases generally relate to specific issues, such as the
interest of a state in providing recovery in a wrongful death action,1 2 but
even in such cases courts have acknowledged great difficulty in isolating
policy factors in such a way as to allow predictable decision making.1 13
In the international jurisdictional context the situations in which inter-
ests must be weighed are substantially more complex. The court must
somehow balance one state's interest in regulation of foreign conduct
against the right of another state to be free from interference. 114
It is not an effective solution to the problem to list factors that may
have some relationship to an issue and to require a court to decide, after
examining those facts, when U.S. interests are strong enough to justify
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction; it is only through the creation
of a legal structure for evaluating such factors that they can be related to
each other and to other cases in other situations and thereby become part
of a process of law.
Finally, the vagueness inherent in balancing renders a court suscepti-
ble to external pressure, especially when it is called on to deny jurisdic-
tion in a case involving its own nationals. In such cases a court is likely
to have difficulty in denying jurisdiction, unless the court can base its
decision on a legal principle that clearly prohibits the exercise of such
jurisdiction.
Balancing represents a step toward an effective jurisdictional para-
digm. But it needs to be complemented with other principles which help
to overcome the problems balancing poses. Only then will it provide an
adequate basis for solving the jurisdictional problem.
IV. The International Law Principle of Non-Interference
One such principle is the principle of non-interference. This principle
110. See, e.g., Vitta, supra note 107.
111. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y. 2d 121, 286 N.E. 2d 454 (1972).
112. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 191 N.E. 2d 279 (1963).
113. See, eg., Neumeier v. Kuebner, 31 N.Y. 2d 121, 127, 286 N.E. 2d 454, 458 (1972).
114. According to Judge Robert Bork, "Some courts have struggled to ... convert a
balancing of foreign policy and competition concerns into something resembling law. ...
[Tihe effort to transmute a raw policy judgment into a judgment according to law is, in the
end, unsuccessful. . . . The task is inherently impossible." Bork, Introduction to Special Is-
sues in InternationalAntitrust, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 241, 244 (1982).
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is part of international law, and the need is further to develop and inte-
grate it into the jurisdictional structure.
The principle of non-interference began to develop in the mid-eight-
eenth century. The Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel was one of the first
to discuss the concept in 1757.115 According to Vattel: "Foreign states
have no right to interfere in the government of a foreign state. To govern
oneself as one wishes is an attribute of independence. A sovereign state
may not be disturbed by another state unless it has given that state the
right to intervene in its affairs." 11 6 Vattel saw the doctrine as a natural
application of the concepts of sovereignty and independence.
During the nineteenth century, this non-interference concept gradually
became accepted by the international community as a basic principle of
international law, and it remains a fundamental tenet of the international
system. Although terminology has varied, with the term "non-interven-
tion" often being used interchangeably with the term "non-interfer-
ence," 117 the basic broad concept of non-interference articulated by
Vattel has remained unchanged.
This concept has always been broadly defined. 118 The reason for this
broad scope lies in the fundamental role of the principle of non-interfer-
ence within the international law system,' 19 and it has been underscored
in recent years in a variety of multi-state declarations and multilateral
conventions.120
115. For the historical development of the concept, see, e.g., A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS,
NON-INTERVENTION 3-67 (1956); F. DE LIMA, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-
28 (1971); and Winfield, The History of Intervention in International Law, 3 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L
L. 130 (1922-23).
116. E. DE VATTEL, LE Daorr DES GENS, quoted in I. Fabela, INTERVENTION 15 (1961).
117. For a discussion of the etymology of the terms "interference" and "intervention" in
this context, see Winfield, supra note 115, at 131-39.
118. According to one of the leading international law commentaries of the first half of the
twentieth century, "The term intervention is here used to describe simply the interference by a
state in the domestic or foreign affairs of another in opposition to its will and serving by design
or implication to impair its political independence." 1 C. HYDE, supra note 57, at 117.
One review of another early twentieth century text concluded that, "a reader, after perusing
Phillimore's chapter upon intervention might close the book with the impression that interven-
tion might be anything from a speech of Lord Palmerston's in the House of Commons to the
partition of Poland." 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 300 (2d ed. 1970).
119. According to Brownlie, "a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdic-
tion of other states is [one of] the principal corollaries of the sovereignty and equality of
states." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 287. The scope of the. non-interference principle is
determined by the fact that it is an application of the principles of sovereignty and equality.
120. One of the broadest statements of the principle is found in the Declaration of Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly of
October 24, 1970:
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed inter-
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One potential source of confusion regarding the non-interference prin-
ciple requires analysis. During the nineteenth century the term "non-
intervention" came to be used not only to refer to the general concept of
non-interference, but also to a particular application of this concept -
namely, its use in the context of international coercion (the use of force,
the threat of force or similar coercive measures by one state against an-
other state in order to impair that state's political independence).
Because the course of international relations during the past century
and a half has focused attention on the use of the non-interference princi-
ple almost exclusively in the context of coercion, many have assumed this
is the only context in which it is properly applied.121 In fact, the concept
has been used primarily to distinguish between legitimate exercises of
influence by one state over another state and unlawful coercion of one
state by another.
Where coercive interference generally came to be referred to as inter-
vention, confusion arose, because the term non-intervention thus ac-
quired two distinct meanings. On the one hand, as we have seen, it was
used synonymously with the term "non-interference." On the other
hand, it also referred to the specific legal principles developed in the con-
text of coercive non-interference.122
The tendency to identify specific principles of coercive non-interven-
tion with the general concept of non-interference also derives from the
fact that the non-interference principle has played, until recently, a rela-
tively minor role in other areas. This is especially true with regard to
jurisdiction. The reason, however, is not that the principle is not prop-
erly applicable to the jurisdictional context, but rather that until the ad-
vent of the effects principle,, there was no need to apply the concept of
non-interference in the area of jurisdiction, because the territoriality par-
adigm automatically provided its own sphere of protection from asser-
tions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
vention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of
the state or against its political, economic, and cultural elements, are in violation of inter-
national law. . . .Every state has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic,
and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another state.
U.N.G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/18028
(1971), reprinted in 9 I. L. M. 1292 (1970).
121. See, e.g., 2 E. NEREP, supra note 27, at 552-55
122. For example, according to Lawrence-Winfield:
The essence of intervention is force, or the threat of force in case the dictates of the
intervening power are disregarded. . . .There can be no intervention without, on the one
hand, the presence of force, naked or veiled, and on the other hand, the absence of consent
on the part of the combatants.
T. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (revd. P. Winfield, 7th ed.
1923).
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The confusion relating to terminology and usage thus should not be
allowed to obscure the fundamental point that the legal principles relat-
ing to intervention, or coercive interference, are merely specific applica-
tions of the general principle of non-interference. Consequently, the
scope of such principles cannot limit the scope of the general principle
from which they derive.
V. Non-Interference and International Jurisdiction
When a state attaches legal consequences to conduct in another state,
it exercises control over that conduct, and when such control affects es-
sential interests in the foreign state, it may constitute an interference with
the sovereign rights of that foreign state. Consequently, the principle of
non-interference is properly applicable to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Moreover, incorporation of the concept of non-interference into the
jurisdictional structure responds to the needs of the international sys-
tem. 123 This concept provides that a state is not entitled under interna-
tional law to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction when such assertion
would interfere with legally protected interests of another state. Integra-
tion of this non-interference principle into the jurisdictional paradigm
would provide an effective legal framework for considering the interests
of states affected by an exercise of jurisdiction. With it, the basic goals of
balancing are achieved, while the weaknesses of a pure balancing ap-
proach are minimized.
Integrating this non-interference principle into the legal structure of
jurisdiction creates a three-pronged jurisdictional analysis. First, a basis
of jurisdiction exists if there is a sufficient relationship between the regu-
lating state and the proscribed conduct. Second, the assertion of jurisdic-
tion is not permitted by international law if it would interfere with legally
protected interests of a foreign state. The principle of non-interference
thus would delimit the range of permitted jurisdictional competence. Fi-
nally, the concept of reasonableness requires that jurisdictional rights not
be abused. Application of the reasonableness concept would negate juris-
diction if the interest of the regulating state in regulating the conduct is
clearly and substantially outweighed by likely harm to the governmental
interests of a state affected by such exercise of jurisdiction.124
Within this structure, the reasonableness concept continues to play an
important role, but its function is limited to identifying cases of jurisdic-
123. The concept of "systemic need" in relation to the international law of jurisdiction is
discussed in Maier, supra note 41, at 303-16.
124. This structure is similar in certain respects to the approach being developed in Ger-
many. See Gerber, supra note 5, at 772-79.
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tional abuse. 125 Whereas the concept of reasonableness may be too vague
to be effective as a framework for international jurisdiction, that concept
is appropriate to the more limited task of identifying situations in which
jurisdictional rights are abused.126
The addition of the non-interference principle restores to the jurisdic-
tional framework the effectiveness lost with the advent of the effects prin-
ciple. The territoriality paradigm automatically created for each state a
territorially-defined sphere of protection. The effects principle destroyed
the effectiveness of the paradigm by eliminating the territorial principle's
sphere of protection. Where the effects principle operates, protection for
affected foreign states must be provided by other legal concepts. The
non-interference principle provides such protection by delimiting a
sphere of operation for each state within which it is protected from juris-
dictional incursions by other states. Unlike current formulations of in-
ternational jurisdictional principles, which invite conflict and encourage
unfettered extensions of jurisdiction by considering only the relationship
between the regulating state and the conduct, a jurisdictional paradigm
that incorporates the non-interference principle will provide a means for
considering the "other side" of the jurisdictional issue by focusing on the
interests of affected states.
The structure of this non-interference paradigm is critical because it is
the mechanism that will provide reasonable predictability and render the
law amenable to judicial application. While balancing is an essentially
amorphous notion, the non-interference paradigm isolates specific rela-
tionships to which particular principles are applicable. The relationship
between the regulating state and the conduct determines whether a state
has a basis of jurisdiction. The principle of non-interference then indi-
cates whether the exercise of jurisdiction. violates the entitlements of
some other state. Finally, by applying the concept of reasonableness, the
decision-maker may determine whether the regulating state has abused
its jurisdictional competence. This isolation of specific relationships cre-
ates a jurisdictional structure that can be applied with reasonable consis-
tency and predictability. 127
125. This view appears in RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §403, supra note
103, Comment a.
126. An abuse principle logically requires that the interests of the states not be merely
"balanced," but that the exercise of jurisdiction only be declared unlawful when the interests
of the regulatory state in regulating conduct are significantly outweighed by the interests of the
affected states in disallowing the proposed regulation. Thus, the Draft Restatement's reasona-
bleness concept is more appropriate to identify abuse than toserve as the basis of a "balanc-
ing" test.
127. Use of the non-interference principle represents the application of a legal principle to
the relationship between the regulating state and the affected state. Moreover, it has the spe-
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Integration of the non-interference concept into the jurisdictional
framework minimizes jurisdictional conflicts by focusing on and protect-
ing those interests that are likely to be of greatest importance to the af-
fected state. It assures states that certain essential state interests are
legally protected, and it makes clear to any state that the invasion of this
sphere violates international law. Thus, the non-interference paradigm
can substantially lessen the uncertainties and concomitant tensions in-
volved in jurisdictional conflict situations.
This structure also creates incentives to restrict rather than expand
jurisdictional assertions. Whereas the effects principle creates an incen-
tive for states to extend their assertions of jurisdictional rights, the princi-
ple of non-interference creates a counterbalancing incentive for states to
limit their jurisdictional assertions, and to support a reasonably large
sphere of protection. 128 This follows from the fact that all states must
depend for protection on the same principle. '
By introducing the concept of non-interference, it may be possible to
obtain broad international acceptance for the jurisdictional framework.
Whereas balancing is essentially a U.S. notion, the principle of non-inter-
ference is distilled from the practice of states and represents the applica-
tion of general principles to an area in which they are regularly used. 129
A national court utilizing such a principle is applying international law
and deriving its authority from the practice of states.
In addition, the principle of non-interference is capable of appealing to
civil law-trained judges and officials. Because the problem of extraterri-
toriality must be solved internationally, an effective international legal
paradigm must appeal to a broad spectrum of courts. It must be used by
courts, lawyers, and officials in many countries and from many legal tra-
ditions. Whereas civil law jurisdictions have generally rejected balancing
concepts as too unstructured, 130 the non-interference principle is suffi-
cific purpose of protecting state entitlements against the exercise ofjurisdiction. This does not,
of course, suggest that there will be no difficult cases, nor does it call for a mechanical or
"black-letter" approach to the issue. Professor Lowenfeld's argument that rules and norms are
inappropriate in the international jurisidetion context may relate to the fact that the concep-
tual framework which has been operative has been particularly undifferentiating and inflexible.
See Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 321. The framework proposed here combines flexibility with
reasonable certainty. The critical factor is that the conceptual structure of the applicable law
renders often extremely complex situations susceptible of judicial resolution.
128.' The non-interference principle, however, creates an incentive for states to restrict
their jurisdictional assertions because they cannot adopt a policy of extending their own juris-
diction without reducing the protection they enjoy from jurisdictional incursions by other
states.
129. The Draft Restatement also derives the reasonableness concept from state practice.
See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §403, supra note 103, Comment a.
130. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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ciently structured to be used within this tradition.
Finally, the non-interference principle reduces the external domestic
pressures on the judiciary often present when a balancing approach is
utilized in determining jurisdiction.13 ' If a court determines that an ex-
ercise of jurisdiction would violate the non-interference principle, it is not
open to the charge that it has attached insufficient weight to the interests
of U.S. plaintiffs, as it would be under the balancing approach. The
judge is impelled by a principle of law not to violate rights of a foreign
state.
A. Legal Literature and Case Law
Several leading authorities on international law have specifically recog-
nized a jurisdictional principle of non-interference. One of the first to do
so was Professor F. A. Mann, for whom international prescriptive juris-
diction exists only when (1) there is a reasonable relationship between the
conduct and the forum, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does not inter-
fere with the sovereign rights of another state. "The reference to the
paramountcy of international law implies what one may call the require-
ment of non-interference in the affairs of foreign states."' 132 Mann does
not elaborate on the scope or function of the principle, but he sees it as
derived from the concept of sovereignty.
Professor R. Y. Jennings, now a judge of the International Court of
Justice, also has referred to the concept of non-interference in describing
the international law of jurisdiction. According to Jennings:
Against [a jurisdictional entitlement] must be set also the legitimate and
reasonable interests of the State whose territory is primarily concerned, for
the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction must not be permitted to extend
to the point where the local law is supplanted: where in fact it becomes an
interference by one state in the affairs of another. 133
In his Principles of Public International Law, Professor Ian Brownlie
similarly describes the concept of non-interference, stating that the law-
ful assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction requires "that the principle of
non-intervention in the domestic or territorial jurisdiction of other states
should be observed .... ",34 Thus, each of these writers considers the
principle of non-interference as part of the law of international
jurisdiction.
131. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
132. Mann, supra note 27, at 47.
133. Jennings, supra note 2, at 153. Jennings, however, fails to develop the concept be-
cause he believes that any assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over parties who are not
nationals of the regulating state violates the non-interference principle. See id at 175.
134. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 309.
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Although few courts have applied the principle of non-interference to
the jurisdictional issue, in part, perhaps, because of its lack of articula-
tion and development by international legal scholars, they have done so
in several important instances. A German appeals court recently utilized
the concept of non-interference in the context of the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the German antitrust laws. 135 Bayer/Firestone involved the
appeal of a decision by the German Federal Cartel Office under German
antitrust law to prohibit the purchase of a division of a French subsidiary
of a U.S. corporation by a French subsidiary of a Canadian holding com-
pany owned by a German corporation.1 36 The appeals court rejected the
application of German law to the transaction. It concluded:
These [doubts] result from the fact that ... the center of gravity of the
acquisition plan-which was prohibited in its entirety-is outside the coun-
try, while within the country, in contrast, a relatively unimportant addi-
tional restraint of competition would result from the strengthening of a
market-dominating position of Bayer. The competent French legal office
approves of the acquisition and the competent French authorities welcome
it on the basis of economic and sociopolitical considerations. In this situa-
tion, prohibition of the acquisition with respect to the involved foreign en-
terprises [presents] a conflict between the conflicts-of-law rule of Sec. 98(2)
of the GWB. . . and generally recognized principles of international law,
namely, the principles of (1) reasonable forum contacts in international ad-
ministrative law and (2) the principle of nonintervention.13 7
Bayer/Firestone represents the most explicit use of the non-interference
concept in the context of jurisdiction.13 8
A jurisdictional principle of non-interference thus has been recognized
by both commentators and courts. Articulation and development of the
non-interference concept in the context of international jurisdiction,
however, has been impeded by the narrow conceptual limits of the con-
troversy about the validity of the effects principle. As long as the center
of concern was the validity and scope of the effects principle, articulation
and development of the non-interference concept was effectively
precluded.
B. State Practice
A jurisdictional principle of non-interference has been invoked in state
135. For a description of this development and its background, see Gerber, supra note 5, at
772-79.
136. KG, Nov. 26, 1980, WuW/E OLG 2411 (Synthetischer Kautschuk I, 1980) and KG,
Nov. 26, 1980, WuW/E OLG (Synthetischer Kautschuk II, 1980). See also id. at 774.
137. Synthetischer Kautschuk II, at 2420 (emphasis in original).
138. For the most recent decision in this line of cases, see KG, July 1, 1983, WuW/E OLG
3051 (Morris-Rothmans) (on appeal to the Supreme Court of West Germany).
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practice. Even when it is not explicitly recognized, it is often implicit in
actions based on a perceived configuration of international entitlements
and obligations that presupposes the principle of non-interference. The
doctrinal preoccupation of the last forty years with the validity of the
effects principle, however, has obscured the development of this pattern.
In recent years, jurisdictional conflicts generally have related not to
the issue of the validity of the effects principle, but rather to the issue of
interference by regulating states in the affairs of other states. An analysis
of these conflicts reflects widespread, if often unarticulated, reliance on
the concept of non-interference.
1. Diplomatic Protests
Jurisdictional conflicts frequently occur as a result of diplomatic pro-
tests which tend to be based on the unlawfulness of jurisdictional asser-
tions that interfere with protected interests of the affected state.1 39 Thus,
while the doctrinal controversy often has been preoccupied with the issue
of the validity of the effects principle, jurisdictional conflicts have tended
to occur in relation to the issue of whether a particular exercise of juris-
diction was justified. Protests against the exercise of extraterritorial juris-
diction regularly assert that the regulating government has "violated the
sovereignty" of the affected state or "interfered with" that sovereignty by
exercising jurisdiction. 140 Proponents argue that the concept of sover-
eignty establishes a sphere of protected interests for each state and that
foreign jurisdictions may not intrude on that legally protected sphere. 41
2. Public Confrontations
States also have attempted to enforce the non-interference principle by
publicly participating in litigation to contest assertions of jurisdiction.
Participation in litigation entails more costs and more risks than diplo-
matic protest and therefore may serve as a more important indicator of
139. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he concrete causes of these [diplomatic] protests
and the argumentation used in them indicate that the states were more concerned with the
protection of concrete economic interests than with the claim of basic invalidity of the effects
principle." U. IMMENGA & E. MESTMAECKER, supra note 78, at 1882. Such protests and
reactions seldom state the specific rationale behind the assertion of interference, but they regu-
larly represent the position that state sovereignty prohibits one state from interfering in the
affairs of another state. For examples, see INT'L L. Ass'N, supra note 53, at 565-92.
140. The Canadian government explained its protest of U.S. action in conjunction with the
uranium investigation in a memorandum to the United States, dated October 6, 1978:
"[There is [also] the principle of non-interference in the affairs of a foreign State. Although
the determination of what amounts to interference is always a difficult one, it is clear that good
faith and reasonableness are essential ingredients of such a determination." Reprinted in
Copithorne, Canadian Practice in International Law, 17 CAN. Y. B. INT'L L. 334, 335 (1979).
141. See id.
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the strength of the positions taken. 142
The participation of foreign states in litigation in the United States and
elsewhere as amicus curiae or in other forms often has focused on the
claim that jurisdictional assertions have interfered with legally protected
rights of the affected state. For example, in U.S. v. Watchmakers of Swit-
zerland Information Center, Inc., 143 the Swiss government's amicus cu-
riae brief focused on the sovereignty issue in arguing against the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws to the Swiss watch in-
dustry. Counsel for the Swiss government argued that the district court's
proposed judgment involved:
the potential threat of intruding upon the sovereignty of Switzerland and
vital concerns of the Swiss Confederation with respect to the maintenance
of its watch industry as a vibrant part of its total economy . . . . Our
concern throughout has been only with respect to possible interpretation of
the judgment that might be construed to impinge upon Swiss sovereignty
and Swiss concern for its domestic watch industry. 144
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom. Ltd.,1 45 similar positions
were taken by the four governments filing amicus curiae briefs in opposi-
tion to the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the U.S. For exam-
ple, the government of South Africa stated:
In the view of the South African Government there is no legal justification
for the extra-territorial application of U.S. anti-trust laws to South African
companies whose association and activities with other non-U.S. uranium
producers directed at stabilizing the industry outside the U.S. were not only
lawful under South African law but considered by the South African Gov-
ernment to be in the national interest. The South African Government re-
spectfully, but with equal emphasis, submits that apart from the legal and
economic implications of such application, extra-territorial application of
such laws to non-U.S. companies acting lawfully in terms of their own na-
tional laws and international law, would constitute a challenge to the sover-
eignty of nations and could disturb friendly relations with the United
States. 146
Other amicus curiae submissions also emphasized the fact that extraterri-
torial application of U.S. law would interfere with domestic interests. 14 7
142. For a discussion of the evidentiary value of protests and other diplomatic practice, see
A. D'AmATo, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-72 (1971).
143. 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1966 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
144. Haight, supra note 13, at 334-35.
145. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
146. Brief of Government of the Republic of South Africa as Amicus-Curiae at 7, Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd.
147. See, eg., Memorandum of the Government of Australia at 4-9, and Memorandum of
the Government of Canada at 2-6, Westinghouse.
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3. Blocking Legislation
Blocking legislation represents the third major category of state prac-
tice based on the non-interference principle. It is particularly significant,
because a state that passes blocking legislation often incurs substantial
costs and risks, and thus such actions may indicate strong support of the
legal positions involved.
Blocking legislation is specifically intended to thwart the extraterrito-
rial application of antitrust or other economic regulatory laws. There are
three main types of provisions included in such legislation. The first pro-
hibits the production of documents to be used in foreign antitrust litiga-
tion, the second prevents domestic courts from enforcing orders of
foreign courts in antitrust litigation, and the third provides a domestic
cause of action in favor of a domestic party forced to pay particular kinds
of damages in such litigation. These legislative provisions are designed to
protect the state from interference in the form of jurisdictional assertions
by another state.
Blocking statutes began to appear as early as the late 1940's in re-
sponse to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United
States.148 The number and severity of such statutes increased signifi-
cantly in the 1960's, largely in response to U.S. investigations of the ship-
ping industry, and there has been a further increase in recent years,
mainly in response to the uranium cases. 149
Blocking legislation generally is based on the claim that international
law entitles states to the protection that such legislation represents. It is
seen as a means of enforcing rights established by international law and
represents an application of the principle of non-interference.
For example, when it adopted blocking legislation,1 50 the British gov-
ernment stated that its aim was "to reassert and reinforce the defenses of
the United Kingdom against attempts by other countries to enforce their
economic and commercial policies unilaterally on us."1 51 The aim of the
legislation was thus protection from the imposition of foreign policies
within Britain. 152 Vitually all blocking legislation has been enacted for
148. See generally 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 10, at §4.17.
149. Blocking legislation also has been inspired by the realization that the most effective
defense to extraterritorial application of U.S. law is the foreign government compulsion de-
fense. Because U.S. courts generally will not enforce American laws where such enforcement
would require foreign conduct that would violate foreign law, foreign governments have an
incentive to compel, and thus protect, certain kinds of activities.
150. Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1981.
151. 973 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979), reprinted in Lowe, supra note 16, at 257.
152. Canada's stated reasons for adopting its blocking legislation were similar. According
to the Canadian government:
Canada considered it contrary to her sovereign prerogative for foreign states to question
the propriety or legality of the actions of Canadian uranium producers that were taken
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the same basic stated purpose. 153
If one turns from the stated reasons for blocking legislation to an anal-
ysis of the legislation itself, it is evident that the principle of non-interfer-
ence is a major operative concept in such legislation. For example, the
central provision of the French blocking statute, enacted in 1980,154 pto-
hibits French nationals, residents, and representatives of companies hav-
ing an office in France from giving to foreign public officials any
document or information "which threatens the sovereignty, the security,
or the essential economic interests of France or [its] public policy (ordre
public). ... 155 The predecessor law, dating from 1968,156 referred to
the concept of sovereignty alone, and references to "essential economic
interests" and "security" were added to the statute in order to avoid any
uncertainty concerning the scope of the concept.1 57
The British Protection of Trading Interests Act is also built around the
concept of non-interference.158 According to section 1 of the Act, the
Secretary of State is empowered to take "blocking" actions when a for-
eign state has taken, or proposes to take, measures that he believes "are
damaging or threaten to damage the trading interests of the United
Kingdom." 159 The use of the "trading interests" concept was designed
to make clear that the statute protected sovereignty in the broadest sense,
including "economic sovereignty." 160 Thus, the principle which is opera-
tive here is the principle of non-interference.
Other blocking statutes reflect the same pattern and are based on the
same principle. They represent an effort by states to defend those inter-
ests which were formerly protected by international law through the
principle of territoriality. Thus, they represent a response to the develop-
ment of the effects principle.
outside the United States and were required by Canadian law or taken in implementation
of Canadian government policy. . . .The Canadian government promulgated the Regula-
tions to serve a vital national interest, particularly the preservation of Canada's past and
future sovereign authority to secure compliance with its own laws and policies respecting
a vital Canadian natural resource in the face of jurisdiction by non-Canadian tribunals.
These Regulations were not procured by members of the uranium industry, and they were
not adopted to protect the commercial interests of those companies.
Amicus Curiae filing of the Canadian Government, quoted in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada
Ltd., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCII) 63,285, at 78,453 (Can. S. Ct. 1980).
153. See generally Cira, supra note 15, at 247-60.
154. Law Concerning the Communication of Documents, supra note 18.
155. Id. at art. 2.
156. Law No. 68-678, July 26, 1968, 1968 J.O. 7267.
157. See Toms, supra note 18, at 591-92.
158. See Protection of Trading Interests Act, supra note 16.
159. Id. at §1.
160. Lowe, supra note 16, at 274. The predecessor blocking statute empowered the Secre-
tary to take such action when he believed that foreign actions "constitute[d] an infringement of
the jurisdiction which, under international law, belongs to the United Kingdom." Shipping
Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87.
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Conclusion
The advent of the effects principle undermined the effectiveness of the
territoriality paradigm which had allocated prescriptive jurisdictional
competence among states. In doing so, it created a need for a modifica-
tion of that paradigm to protect states from jurisdictional interference.
Balancing was a first and important attempt introduced by courts to
meet this need. Yet balancing has several difficulties which must be rem-
edied if an effective international jurisdictional framework is to operate.
The incorporation of the principle of non-interference as a major in-
gredient of the jurisdictional framework, as proposed in this Article, re-
sponds to needs created by changes in the international system, and it
minimizes the deficiencies of the balancing approach. As non-interfer-
ence begins to be considered as a necessary ingredient of a new jurisdic-
tional framework, its proper content will be defined by the regular
assertion-response process of international law.161 This process will only
operate, however, when the non-interference principle is recognized as an
essential part of the jurisdictional framework.
The articulation of a jurisdictional framework that includes the princi-
ple of non-interference also should encourage bilateral and multilateral
attempts to agree on the scope of that principle, because it provides a
mechanism for reflecting and aligning the interests of all states. Using
such a framework, the international community can move away from the
pattern of international jurisdictional conflict in which it now finds itself
and toward a process of defining collectively acceptable limits on state
behavior.
The continuing escalation of international jurisdictional conflicts in the
postwar period indicates that the existing jurisdictional paradigm is inad-
equate. These conflicts also indicate the concepts that must be integrated
into the jurisdictional framework in order to restore its effectiveness.
These concepts include non-interference, the articulation and develop-
ment of which could be critical to the orderly development of the world
economy and ultimately, perhaps, to world order.
161. See generally McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A
Policy-Oriented Perspective, in M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 157, 185 (1960).
